Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Jim Joyce argues for two amendments to probabilism. The first is the doctrine that credences are rational, or not, in virtue of their accuracy or “closeness to the truth” (1998). The second is a shift from a numerically precise model of belief to an imprecise model represented by a set of probability functions (2010). We argue that both amendments cannot be satisfied simultaneously. To do so, we employ a (slightly-generalized) impossibility theorem of Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane (2012), who show that there is no strictly proper scoring rule for imprecise probabilities. The question then is what should give way. Joyce, who is well aware of this no-go result, thinks that a quantifiability constraint on epistemic accuracy should be relaxed to accommodate imprecision. We argue instead that another Joycean assumption — called strict immodesty— should be rejected, and we prove a representation theorem that characterizes all “mildly” immodest measures of inaccuracy.

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
A forward looking decision rule for imprecise credences.Rohan Sud - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):119-139.
Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.
You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.
Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise.Sarah Moss - 2011 - Mind 120 (480):1053-1069.
Dutch Book Arguments and Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2012 - In Dennis Dieks, Stephan Hartmann, Michael Stoeltzner & Marcel Weber (eds.), Probabilities, Laws and Structures. Springer.
Vague Credence.Aidan Lyon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3931-3954.
Expressing Credences.Daniel Rothschild - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.
A dilemma for the imprecise bayesian.Namjoong Kim - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1681-1702.
Immodest inductive methods.David Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (1):54-63.
Quantificational Credences.Benjamin Lennertz - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.


Added to PP

767 (#21,486)

6 months
120 (#36,162)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Gregory Wheeler
Frankfurt School Of Finance And Management
Conor Mayo-Wilson
University of Washington

References found in this work

The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1925 - London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Edited by R. B. Braithwaite.
Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.

View all 39 references / Add more references