Philosophical Psychology 34 (1):102-124 (2021)
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Abstract |
Experimental philosophy has focused attention on the role that intuitive responses to philosophical cases play in philosophical argumentation. The method of appealing to such cases has been dubbed the “method of cases,” and, in recent work, Edouard Machery has both defended its prevalence and uniformity in philosophical practice, and criticized its epistemic value. In this paper, I argue that there is no single method of cases, but rather a set of methods of cases. To defend this claim, I distinguish and articulate these different methods and argue that they better explain several paradigmatic appeals to cases. This result not only challenges the homogeneity of the method of cases; it also stocks our methodological toolbox with additional interpretive tools which help us to not only better understand philosophical arguments, but to better understand the significance of experimental work.
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Keywords | experimental philosophy intuition philosophical methodology metaphilosophy philosophy of mind thought experiments |
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DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2020.1845309 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them.Joshua Greene - 2013 - Penguin Press.
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