The Modal Perfection Argument for the Existence of a Supreme Being

Philo 6 (2):299-313 (2003)
Abstract
The Modal Perfection Argument (MPA) for the existence of a Supreme Being is a new ontological argument that is rooted in the insights of Anselm, Leibniz and Gödel. Something is supreme if and only if nothing is possibly greater, and a perfection is a property that it is better to have than not. The premises of MPA are that supremity is a perfection, perfections entail only perfections, and the negation of a perfection is not a perfection. I do three things in this paper. First, I prove that MPA is valid by constructing a formal deduction of it in second order modal logic. Second, I argue that its premises are true. Third, I defend the argument and the logic used against some likely objections
Keywords Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 1098-3570
DOI 10.5840/philo20036222
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Citations of this work BETA
A Simpler Free Will Defence.C’Zar Bernstein & Nathaniel Helms - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):197-203.
A Gödelian Ontological Argument Improved.Alexander R. Pruss - 2009 - Religious Studies 45 (3):347-353.
Pruss's Ontological Arguments.Graham Oppy - 2009 - Religious Studies 45 (3):355-363.
Higher-Order Ontological Arguments.Graham Oppy - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1066-1078.

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