What Frege's Theory of Identity is Not


Authors
Robert May
University of California, Davis
Abstract
The analysis of identity as coreference is strongly associated with Frege ; it is the view in Begriffsschrift, and, some have argued, henceforth throughout his work. This thesis is incorrect: Frege never held that identity is coreference. The case is made not by interpretation of “proof-quotes”, but rather by exploring how Frege actually deploys the concept. Two cases are considered. The first, from Grundgesetze, are the definitions of the core concepts, zero and truth; the second, from Begriffsschrift, is the validity of Leibniz's Law. In both cases, if identity is coreference, results ensue that would be unacceptable to Frege
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1002/tht3.6
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 47,385
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Frege’s Unification.Rachel Boddy - 2018 - History and Philosophy of Logic 40 (2):135-151.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Frege on Identities.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2000 - History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (3):195-205.
Can Frege Pose Frege's Puzzle?Stavroula Glezakos - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 202.
Frege, the Identity of Sinn and Carnap's Intension.I. Hanzel - 2006 - History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (3):229-247.
Basic Particulars and the Identity Thesis.Martin A. Bertman - 1972 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 3 (1):1-8.
Frege: Two Theses, Two Senses.Carlo Penco - 2003 - History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (2):87-109.
Frege's Proof of Referentiality.Øystein Linnebo - 2004 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 45 (2):73-98.
I. Interpreting Frege: A Reply to Michael Dummett.Gregory Currie - 1983 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):345 – 359.
Frege's Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions.Ari Maunu - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-03-16

Total views
99 ( #88,788 of 2,291,323 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #827,672 of 2,291,323 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature