Propositional Gratitude

American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):55-66 (2012)
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Abstract

Philosophical writing on gratitude displays a pronounced preference for targeted gratitude (A’s being grateful to B for x) over propositional gratitude (A’s being grateful that p), treating the latter as a poor, less interesting cousin of the former, when it treats it at all. This paper challenges and attempts to rectify the relegation of propositional gratitude to second-class status. It argues that propositional gratitude is not only not reducible to targeted gratitude but indeed is more basic than it and that propositional gratitude is morally important because of its conceptual connections to the virtue of humility.

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Sean McAleer
University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire

Citations of this work

Commonsense Morality and Contact with Value.Adam Lovett & Stefan Riedener - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1:1-21.
Gratitude and Appreciation.Tony Manela - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (3):281-294.
Gratitude.Tony Manela - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2015 (Spring).
Negative Feelings of Gratitude.Tony Manela - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (1):129-140.

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