Pettit's non-iteration constraint

Utilitas 20 (1):59-64 (2008)
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Abstract

I discuss Philip Pettit’s argument that appreciation is not a proper response to value because it fails to satisfy the non-iteration constraint, according to which, where V is a value and R is a response to value, R-ing V must not be distinct from R-ing R-ing V. After motivating the non-iteration constraint and conceding that appreciation fails to satisfy the constraint, I argue that the consequentialist’s preferred response to value, promotion, also violates the constraint, leaving Pettit with a dilemma: if he insists on the constraint, then promotion is not a proper response to value; if he does not insist on the constraint, then his argument against appreciation as a proper response to value fails.

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Sean McAleer
University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire

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The Consequentialist Perspective.Philip Pettit - 1997 - In Marcia W. Baron, Philip Pettit & Michael Slote, Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Profiles of the Virtues.Christine Swanton - 1995 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76 (1):47-72.

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