The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Free Will

Stance 3:1-8 (2010)
Blake McAllister
Hillsdale College
I examine Leibniz’s version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason with respect to free will, paying particular attention to Peter van Inwagen’s argument that this principle leads to determinism. Ultimately I conclude that Leibniz’s formulation is incompatible with free will. I then discuss a reformulation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason endorsed by Alexander Pruss that, I argue, manages to both retain the strength of Leibniz’s formulation and remain consistent with free will.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 1943-1880
DOI 10.5840/stance201031
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