Moral perception and the causal objection

Ratio 23 (3):291-307 (2010)

Abstract
One of the primary motivations behind moral anti-realism is a deep-rooted scepticism about moral knowledge. Moral realists attempt counter this worry by sketching a plausible moral epistemology. One of the most radical proposals in the recent literature is that we know moral facts by perception – we can literally see that an action is wrong, etc. A serious objection to moral perception is the causal objection. It is widely conceded that perception requires a causal connection between the perceived and the perceiver. But, the objection continues, we are not in appropriate causal contact with moral properties. Therefore, we cannot perceive moral properties. This papers demonstrates that the causal objection is unsound whether moral properties turn out to be secondary, natural properties; non-secondary, natural properties; or non-natural properties. 1.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00468.x
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
Moral Experience: Its Existence, Describability, and Significance.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - In C. Erhard and T. Keiling (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency. London and New York: Routledge.
A Limited Defense of Moral Perception.Justin P. McBrayer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320.
The Mystery of Moral Perception.Daniel Crow - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (2):187-210.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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