Ratio 23 (3):291-307 (2010)
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Abstract |
One of the primary motivations behind moral anti-realism is a deep-rooted scepticism about moral knowledge. Moral realists attempt counter this worry by sketching a plausible moral epistemology. One of the most radical proposals in the recent literature is that we know moral facts by perception – we can literally see that an action is wrong, etc. A serious objection to moral perception is the causal objection. It is widely conceded that perception requires a causal connection between the perceived and the perceiver. But, the objection continues, we are not in appropriate causal contact with moral properties. Therefore, we cannot perceive moral properties. This papers demonstrates that the causal objection is unsound whether moral properties turn out to be secondary, natural properties; non-secondary, natural properties; or non-natural properties. 1.
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DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00468.x |
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References found in this work BETA
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Perceptual Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience.Preston J. Werner - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (3):294-317.
A Limited Defense of Moral Perception.Justin P. McBrayer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320.
Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception.Robert Cowan - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.
View all 17 citations / Add more citations
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