Process reliabilism, virtue reliabilism, and the value of knowledge

Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):289-302 (2007)
The value problem for knowledge is the problem of explaining why knowledge is cognitively more valuable than mere true belief. If an account of the nature of knowledge is unable to solve the value problemfor knowledge, this provides a pro tanto reason to reject that account. Recent literature argues that process reliabilism is unable to solve the value problem because it succumbs to an objection known as theswamping objection. Virtue reliabilism, on the other hand, is able to solve the value problem because it can avoid the swamping objection. I argue that virtue reliabilism escapes theswamping objection only by employing what I call an entailment strategy. Furthermore, since an entailment strategy is open to the process reliabilist, I argue that the process reliabilist is also able to escape the swamping objection and thereby solve the value problem for knowledge.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2007.tb00053.x
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