Raz on the Internal Point of View

Legal Theory 17 (3):67-73 (2011)
This article addresses the question of whether judges can take the internal point of view towardtheir legal system's rule of recognition for purely prudential reasons. It takes a fresh look at an underappreciated conceptual argument of Joseph Raz's that answers: no. In a nutshell, Raz argues that purely prudential reasons are reasons of the wrong kind for judges to accept their legal system's rule of recognition. And should Raz's argument succeed, an important necessary connection between law and morality would be established
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DOI 10.1017/S1352325211000127
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References found in this work BETA
Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
Scott Shapiro (2011). Legality. Harvard University Press.

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