The Dogmatists and Wright on Moore’s “Proof”

Authors
Mark McBride
National University of Singapore
Abstract
Suppose one has a visual experience as of having hands, and then reasons as follows: I have hands, If I have hands an external world exists; An external world exists. Suppose one’s visual experience gives one defeasible perceptual warrant, or justification, to believe – that is, one’s experience makes it epistemically appropriate to believe . And suppose one comes to believe on the basis of this visual experience. The conditional premise is knowable a priori. And can be established by modus ponens inference. If one reasons thus, say one’s engaged in -reasoning. What, if anything, is wrong with -reasoning? I consider two prominent responses to this question – the dogmatists’ and Crispin Wright’s. Each finds fault in -reasoning, but on different grounds. I argue Wright’s response faces a problem which is standardly only taken to be faced by dogmatists
Keywords G.E. Moore   Crispin Wright   external world scepticism   dogmatism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1163/221057011X554133
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,515
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Perceptual Entitlement.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.
Epistemic Operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Sosa's Moore and the New Dogmatists.Susana Nuccetelli - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (2):180-186.
The Paradox of Moore's Proof of an External World.Annalisa Coliva - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):234–243.
Sextus Empiricus on the Possibility of Inquiry.Filip Grgic - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):436-459.
Recent Work on Moore’s Proof.J. Adam Carter - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):115-144.
Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles.Ernest Sosa - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (8):410-430.
How to Reid Moore.John Greco - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):544-563.
Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on Inference.Ulf Hlobil - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):419-429.
Moorean Responses to Skepticism: A Defense. [REVIEW]Tim Willenken - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):1 - 25.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-11-23

Total downloads
34 ( #179,720 of 2,268,154 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #373,366 of 2,268,154 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature