Oxford: Oxford University Press (2021)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Phenomenal Conservatism (the view that an appearance that p gives one prima facie justification for believing that p) is a promising, and popular, internalist theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity, it faces numerous objections and challenges. For instance, epistemologists have argued that Phenomenal Conservatism is incompatible with Bayesianism, is afflicted by bootstrapping and cognitive penetration problems, does not guarantee that epistemic justification is a stable property, does not provide an account of defeat, and is not a complete theory of epistemic justification. This book shows that Phenomenal Conservatism is actually immune to some of these problems, though not all of them. Accordingly, it explores the prospects of integrating Phenomenal Conservatism with Explanationism (the view that epistemic justification is a matter of explanatory relations between one’s evidence and propositions supported by that evidence). The resulting theory, Phenomenal Explanationism, has advantages over Phenomenal Conservatism and Explanationism taken on their own. Phenomenal Explanationism is a highly unified, comprehensive internalist theory of epistemic justification that delivers on the promises of Phenomenal Conservatism while avoiding its pitfalls.
|
Keywords | phenomenal conservatism explanationism defeaters epistemic justification seemings reflective awareness bootstrapping scepticism |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2021 |
Buy this book | $59.50 new (15% off) $64.18 used (8% off) $70.00 from Amazon Amazon page |
ISBN(s) | 0192896873 9780192896872 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Seemings and Epistemic Justification: How Appearances Justify Beliefs.Luca Moretti - 2020 - Cham: Springer.
Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and Epistemic Justification.Christos Georgakakis, and & Luca Moretti - 2019 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Citations of this work BETA
Refuting two dilemmas for infallibilism.Giada Fratantonio & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-12.
From One Conservative to Another: A Critique of Epistemic Conservatism.Blake McAllister - 2021 - Southwest Philosophy Review 37 (2):167-186.
Similar books and articles
"Antiscepticism and Easy Justification" - Ch 5 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
Seemings and Epistemic Justification: How Appearances Justify Beliefs.Luca Moretti - 2020 - Cham: Springer.
Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):267-280.
"Concluding Remarks" - Ch 6 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
Inferential Seemings and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):253-271.
"Table of Contents and Acknowledgments" of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
"Introduction" - Ch 1 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
"Phenomenal Conservatism" - Ch 2 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
"The Bayesian Objection" - Ch 4 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
On the Global Ambitions of Phenomenal Conservatism.Declan Smithies - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):206-244.
Chris Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, NY: OUP (2013). [REVIEW]Luca Moretti - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):364-366.
"Cognitive Penetrability" - Ch 3 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2020-01-25
Total views
309 ( #33,448 of 2,499,037 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
46 ( #18,403 of 2,499,037 )
2020-01-25
Total views
309 ( #33,448 of 2,499,037 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
46 ( #18,403 of 2,499,037 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads