On Difference-splitting and the Equal Weight View

Authors
Randall G. McCutcheon
University of Memphis
Abstract
Dawid, DeGroot and Mortera showed, a quarter century ago, that any agent who regards a fellow agent as a peer--in particular, defers to the fellow agent's prior credences in the same way that she defers to her own--and updates by split-the-difference is prone to diachronic incoherence. On the other hand one may show that there are special scenarios in which Bayesian updating approximates difference splitting, so it remains an important question whether it remains a viable response to ``generic" peer update. We look at arguments by two teams of philosophers against difference splitting.
Keywords Equal Weight View  Split the Difference  Reflection Principle  Peer Disagreement
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