Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):619-630 (1993)
Contrary to Dretske's view, treating actions as causal complexes wherein inner states produce external results does not permit us to claim that even if their components are caused, the actions are not. What triggers the initial element of a causal sequence causes the sequence itself, so whatever might cause the relevant inner state would also cause the action. Dretske's claim that the failure of my agency to extend to the results of actions I induce in others is owing to the "sensitivity" of those results' causal antecedents is also mistaken. Such sensitivity attends the results of my own actions without undoing my agency
|Keywords||Argument Epistemology Freedom Knowledge Metaphysics Dretske, F|
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References found in this work BETA
Postscripts to `Causation'.David Lewis - 1986 - In Philosophical Papers Vol. Ii. Oxford University Press.
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