Explanationist aid for phenomenal conservatism

Synthese 195 (7):3035-3050 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Phenomenal conservatism is a popular theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity and the fact that some think that phenomenal conservatism can provide a complete account of justification, it faces several challenges. Among these challenges are the need to provide accounts of defeaters and inferential justification. Fortunately, there is hope for phenomenal conservatism. Explanationism, the view on which justification is a matter of explanatory considerations, can help phenomenal conservatism with both of these challenges. The resulting view is one that respects the internalist character of phenomenal conservatism and its motivating intuitions while providing an intuitive and elegant account of both inferential justification and the justificatory impact of defeaters.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,100

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A Defense of Restricted Phenomenal Conservatism.Harold Langsam - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (3):315 - 340.
Against Phenomenal Conservatism.Nathan Hanna - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.
Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
Defeating phenomenal conservatism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (1):35-48.
Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?Paul Silva - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):371-387.
Externalist justification and the role of seemings.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):163-184.
Compassionate phenomenal conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
Against Phenomenal Conservatism.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - The Reasoner 7 (10):117-118.
Against Hanna on Phenomenal Conservatism.Kevin McCain - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (1):45-54.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-03-06

Downloads
144 (#130,328)

6 months
12 (#216,527)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kevin McCain
University of Alabama, Birmingham

References found in this work

Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1991 - London and New York: Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer (ed.) - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

View all 65 references / Add more references