Erkenntnis 79 (1):99-109 (2014)

Authors
Kevin McCain
University of Alabama, Birmingham
Abstract
Earl Conee and Richard Feldman have argued that epistemic support should be understood in terms of explanatory considerations. Very roughly, they hold that one’s evidence supports a given proposition when that proposition is part of the best explanation of one’s evidence. This proposal is attractive, but T. Ryan Byerly has recently argued that it is false. Byerly claims that such explanationist accounts of epistemic support cannot account for the fact that one’s evidence can support propositions about the future. Although Byerly presents an interesting challenge, his argument is problematic and, ultimately, unconvincing
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9470-3
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton University Press.
Judgement and Justification.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.

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Citations of this work BETA

Responsibilist Evidentialism.Christopher Michael Cloos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2999-3016.

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