Explanatory Pluralism and The Heuristic Identity Theory

Abstract
University and William Bechtel Washington University Abstract Explanatory pluralism holds that the sorts of comprehensive theoretical and ontological economies, which microreductionists and New Wave reductionists envision and which antireductionists fear, offer misleading views of both scientific practice and scientific progress. Both advocates and foes of employing reductionist strategies at the interface of psychology and neuroscience have overplayed the alleged economies that interlevel connections (including identities) justify while overlooking their fundamental role in promoting scientific research. A brief review of research on visual processing provides support for the explanatory pluralist=s general model of cross-scientific relations and discloses the valuable heuristic role hypothetical identities play in cross-scientific research. That model also supplies grounds for hesitation about the correlation objection to the psycho-physical identity theory and complaints about an explanatory gap in physicalist accounts of consciousness. These takes on psycho-neural connections miss both the sorts of considerations that motivate hypothetical identities in science and their fundamental contribution to progressive research. Thus, their focus on the contributions of research at multiple levels of analysis does not bar explanatory pluralists from considering heuristic identity theory (HIT). Arguably, it encourages it.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,233
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Pluralistic Physicalism and the Causal Exclusion Argument.Markus Eronen - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):219-232.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Typology of Scientific Research.Stefan Ziemski - 1975 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 6 (2):276-291.
Explanatory Pluralism in the Medical Sciences: Theory and Practice.Jeroen van Bouwel - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (5):371-390.
Indispensability Arguments in Favour of Reductive Explanations.Jeroen van Bouwel, Erik Weber & Leen de Vreese - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):33-46.
Distinguishing Explanatory From Nonexplanatory Fictions.Alisa Bokulich - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (5):725-737.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-12-22

Total downloads

487 ( #3,774 of 2,172,937 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #46,154 of 2,172,937 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums