Freeing Aristotelian Epagōgē from “Prior Analytics” II 23

Apeiron 40 (4):345-374 (2007)
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Abstract

Since at least late antiquity, Aristotle’s Prior Analytics B 23 has been misread. Aristotle does not think that an induction is a syllogism made good by complete enumeration. The confusion can be eliminated by considering the nature of the surviving text and watching very closely Aristotle’s moving back and forth between “induction” and “syllogism from induction.” Though he does move freely between them, the two are not synonyms.

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John P. McCaskey
Fordham University

Citations of this work

Indução e Ciência em Aristóteles.Tomás Roberto Troster - 2015 - Dissertation, University of São Paulo, Brazil

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References found in this work

More on Aristotelian Epagoge.T. Engberg-Pedersen - 1979 - Phronesis 24 (3):301-319.
A note on A ristotelian epagōgē.Thomas V. Upton - 1981 - Phronesis 26 (2):172-176.

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