Functionalism and self-consciousness

Mind and Language 15 (5):481-499 (2000)
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Abstract

I offer a philosophically well-motivated solution to a problem that George Bealer has identified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism. The problem is that there seems to be no way to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental-state predicates occur within the scopes of mental-state predicates. My central claim is that the functional roles in terms of which a creature capable of self-consciousness identifies her own mental states must be roles that items could play within creatures whose psychology is less complex than hers. (Bealer’s reply to this paper appears in the same issue of Mind & Language.)

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Mark McCullagh
University of Guelph

Citations of this work

Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Naturalizing Subjective Character.Uriah Kriegel - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism.Arvid Båve - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):1-21.
Is Conscience the Measure of a Person?Elena Ene Drăghici-Vasilescu - 2024 - European Journal of Theology and Philosophy 4 (2):55-60.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Individuals.P. F. Strawson - 1959 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 14 (2):246-246.
How to define theoretical terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.
What is it Like to be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.

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