Mind and Language 15 (5):481-499 (2000)

Authors
Mark McCullagh
University of Guelph
Abstract
I offer a philosophically well-motivated solution to a problem that George Bealer has identified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism. The problem is that there seems to be no way to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental-state predicates occur within the scopes of mental-state predicates. My central claim is that the functional roles in terms of which a creature capable of self-consciousness identifies her own mental states must be roles that items could play within creatures whose psychology is less complex than hers. (Bealer’s reply to this paper appears in the same issue of Mind & Language.)
Keywords Functionalism  Self-consciousness  Bealer, G
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1468-0017.00146
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
How to Define Theoretical Terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.
Individuals.P. F. Strawson - 1959 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 14 (2):246-246.
How to Define Theoretical Terms.David K. Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (2):321-321.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Naturalizing Subjective Character.Uriah Kriegel - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism.Arvid Båve - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):1-21.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
215 ( #37,312 of 2,326,762 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #72,611 of 2,326,762 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes