Philosophical Quarterly (264):536-558 (2016)
Conservatives claim that all phenomenal properties are sensory. Liberals countenance non-sensory phenomenal properties such as what it’s like to perceive some high-level property, and what it’s like to think that p. A hallmark of phenomenal properties is that they present an explanatory gap, so to resolve the dispute we should consider whether experience has non-sensory properties that appear ‘gappy’. The classic tests for ‘gappiness’ are the invertibility test and the zombifiability test. I suggest that these tests yield conflicting results: non-sensory properties lend themselves to zombie scenarios but not to inversion scenarios. Which test should we trust? Against Carruthers & Veillet (2011), I argue that invertibility is not a viable condition of phenomenality. In contrast, being zombifiable is credibly necessary and sufficient for phenomenality. I conclude that there are non-sensory properties of experience that are ‘gappy’ in the right way, and that liberalism is therefore the most plausible position.
|Keywords||consciousness cognitive phenomenology high-level perception the explanatory gap the conceivability argument|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Conscious Thinking and Cognitive Phenomenology: Topics, Views and Future Developments.Marta Jorba & Dermot Moran - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):95-113.
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