Synthese 108 (1):105 - 125 (1996)

The aim of this paper is to distinguish between, and examine, three issues surrounding Humphreys's paradox and interpretation of conditional propensities. The first issue involves the controversy over the interpretation of inverse conditional propensities — conditional propensities in which the conditioned event occurs before the conditioning event. The second issue is the consistency of the dispositional nature of the propensity interpretation and the inversion theorems of the probability calculus, where an inversion theorem is any theorem of probability that makes explicit (or implicit) appeal to a conditional probability and its corresponding inverse conditional probability. The third issue concerns the relationship between the notion of stochastic independence which is supported by the propensity interpretation, and various notions of causal independence. In examining each of these issues, it is argued that the dispositional character of the propensity interpretation provides a consistent and useful interpretation of the probability calculus.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00414007
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,078
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.Wesley C. Salmon & Anne Fagot-Largeault - 1989 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 16 (2):355.
Scientific Explanation.Philip Kitcher & Wesley C. Salmon (eds.) - 1962 - Univ of Minnesota Pr.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Propensities and Pragmatism.Mauricio Suárez - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (2):61-92.
Some Considerations on Conditional Chances.Paul Humphreys - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):667-680.
Propensities and Probabilities.Nuel Belnap - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (3):593-625.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
115 ( #100,451 of 2,498,794 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #210,517 of 2,498,794 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes