How to use a concept you reject

Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):293-319 (2011)

Abstract

Inferentialist accounts of concept possession are often supported by examples in which rejection of some inference seems to amount to rejection of some concept, with the apparently implausible consequence that anyone who rejects the inference cannot so much as understand those who use the concept. This consequence can be avoided by distinguishing conditions necessary for direct uses of a concept (to describe the non-cognitive world) from conditions necessary for content-specifying uses (to specify what someone thinks or says). I consider how this claim about the non-uniformity of concept possession accords with different theories of attitude ascription and with claims about reverse compositionality. Surprisingly little stands in the way of the claim that someone unable to use a concept directly can nevertheless satisfy conditions for using it in a content-specifying thought

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-07-15

Downloads
166 (#72,720)

6 months
21 (#42,432)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mark McCullagh
University of Guelph

References found in this work

Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Uber Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25-50.
The Thought: A Logical Inquiry.Gottlob Frege - 1956 - Mind 65 (259):289-311.
Ueber Sinn Und Bedeutung (Summary).Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Philosophical Review 1 (5):574-575.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work

Moral Responsibility for Concepts.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1381-1397.
Justification As A Loaded Notion.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4897-4916.
Justification as a Loaded Notion.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4897-4916.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Non-Circularity Constraint: Peacocke Vs. Peacocke. L. - 2003 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-2):85-93.
Two Types of Circularity.I. L. Humberstone - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):249-280.
What is Tarski's Common Concept of Consequence?Ignacio Jané - 2006 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):1-42.
On Value and Culture.Guiren Yuan - 2006 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (2):237-244.
A Puzzle About Concept Possession.Mark Siebel - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1):1-22.