Intuitionism and logical syntax

Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):56-77 (2007)
, Rudolf Carnap became a chief proponent of the doctrine that the statements of intuitionism carry nonstandard intuitionistic meanings. This doctrine is linked to Carnap's ‘Principle of Tolerance’ and claims he made on behalf of his notion of pure syntax. From premises independent of intuitionism, we argue that the doctrine, the Principle, and the attendant claims are mistaken, especially Carnap's repeated insistence that, in defining languages, logicians are free of commitment to mathematical statements intuitionists would reject. I am grateful to Nathan Carter, Gary Ebbs, Janet Folina, Luise Prior McCarty, Stewart Shapiro, Neil Tennant, Christopher Tillman, Beth Tropman, Wen-fang Wang, and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. CiteULike Connotea What's this?
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/nkm047
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