Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):183-220 (2005)
AbstractBasic to Robert Brandom’s project in Making It Explicit is the demarcation of singular terms according to the structure of their inferential roles---rather than, as is usual, according to the kinds of things they purport to denote. But the demarcational effort founders on the need to distinguish extensional and nonextensional occurrences of expressions in terms of inferential roles; the closest that an inferentialist can come to drawing that distinction is to discern degrees of extensionality, and that is not close enough. The general moral applies as well to “two factor” theories of content: the notion of inferential role lacks the independence from the notion of denotation that many proponents of such theories have attributed to it.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678.
Citations of this work
Inferentialism and Structuralism: A Tale of Two Theories.Ryan Mark Nefdt - 2018 - Logique Et Analyse 61 (244):489-512.
Similar books and articles
Brandom, Hegel and Inferentialism.Tom Rockmore - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (4):429 – 447.
Brandom on Two Problems of Conceptual Role Semantics.Gabor Forrai - 2009 - In Barbara Merker (ed.), Vertehen nach Heidegger und Brandom.
Brandom on the Normativity of Meaning.Lionel Shapiro - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):141-60.
Pragmatism and Inferentialism.John MacFarlane - 2010 - In Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom: On Making It Explici. Routledge. pp. 81--95.