In Defence of Kantian Humility

Tom McClelland
University of Warwick
Kantian Humility (KH) holds that the intrinsic properties of objects are unknowable for agents such as ourselves. Categorial properties, such as being an object, present a potential threat to KH. Cowling (2010) argues that knowing KH to be true requires knowledge of categorial properties. However, if such properties are shown to be intrinsic properties, then KH is committed to their being unknowable. I defend KH by presenting three alternative responses to this challenge. First, that categorial properties are not properties in the sense relevant to KH. Second, that if they are properties, they are not intrinsic properties. Third, that if they are intrinsic properties, KH is not committed to their being unknowable. I also show how these responses can be applied to a related objection to KH offered by Moore (2001)
Keywords Kant  Intrinsic Properties  Humility
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.9
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Intrinsic Natures: A Critique of Langton on Kant.Lucy Allais - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):143–169.
Receptivity and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties. [REVIEW]James Van Cleve - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):218-237.

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