Motivating inferentialism

Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):77-84 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Robert Brandom has supported his inferentialist conception of semantic content by appealing to the claim that it is a necessary condition on having a propositional attitude that one appreciate the inferential relations it stands in. When we see what considerations can be given in support of that claim, however, we see that it doesn’t even motivate an inferentialist semantics. The problem is that that claim about what it takes to have a propositional attitude does nothing to show that its inferential relations are a feature of its content rather than of the relation that the subject stands in to that content—that is, the attitude.

Similar books and articles

Brandom, Hegel and inferentialism.Tom Rockmore - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (4):429 – 447.
Pragmatism and inferentialism.John MacFarlane - 2010 - In Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom: On Making It Explici. Routledge. pp. 81--95.
Brandom on the normativity of meaning.Lionel Shapiro - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):141-60.
Inferentialism and singular reference.Mark Mccullagh - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):183-220.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
399 (#43,753)

6 months
83 (#45,022)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mark McCullagh
University of Guelph

Citations of this work

Meaning Holism and De Re Ascription.Daniel Whiting - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):575-599.
Disbelieving the Normativity of Content.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):441-456.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references