Methodological individualism considered as a constitutive principle of scientific inquiry

Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):343-54 (1991)
Abstract
The issue of methodological solipsism in the philosophy of mind and psychology has received enormous attention and discussion in the decade since the appearance Jerry Fodor's "Methodological Solipsism" [Fodor 1980]. But most of this discussion has focused on the consideration of the now infamous "Twin Earth" type examples and the problems they present for Fodor's notion of "narrow content". I think there is deeper and more general moral to be found in this issue, particularly in light of Fodor's more recent defense of his view in Psychosemantics [Fodor 1987]. Underlying this discussion are questions about the nature and plausibility of the claim that scientific explanation should observe a constraint of methodological individualism . My goal in what follows is to bring out this more general problem in Fodor's "internalist" account of the mental
Keywords Explanation  Methodological Individualism  Psychology  Science
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DOI 10.1080/09515089108573035
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References found in this work BETA
The Sciences of the Artificial.Herbert A. Simon - 1969 - [Cambridge, M.I.T. Press.
Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology.E. Sober (ed.) - 1994 - The Mit Press. Bradford Books.
Weak Supervenience.John Haugeland - 1982 - American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (January):93-103.

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Citations of this work BETA
Marr's Three Levels: A Re-Evaluation. [REVIEW]Ron McClamrock - 1990 - Minds and Machines 1 (May):185-196.
Functional Analysis and Etiology.Ron McClamrock - 1993 - Erkenntnis 38 (2):249-260.
Irreducibility and Subjectivity.Ron McClamrock - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (2):177-92.

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