Moral Rules as Public Goods

Business Ethics Quarterly 9 (1):103-126 (1999)
The kind of commitment to moral rules that characterizes effective interaction between persons in, among others places,manufacturing and commercial settings is characteristically treated by economists and game theorists as a public good, the securing ofwhich requires the expenditure of scarce resources on surveillance and enforcement mechanisms. Alternatively put, the view is that,characteristically, rational persons cannot voluntarily guide their choices by rules, but can only be goaded into acting in accordancewith such rules by the fear of social and formal sanctions. On this way of thinking, rational individuals are condemned to having to settlefor the "second-best" results that are thereby implied. This conclusion rests not only on an appeal to a consequentialist perspective, butalso a separability principle. Against this, it is argued that consequentialism itself offers a basis for the rejection of the separability principle, and a defense of the thesis that, for a wide range of realistic cases, being disposed to voluntarily guide one's choice by rules (on the condition that others can be expected to do so as well) is a necessary condition of engaging in rational interaction
Keywords Applied Philosophy  Business and Professional Ethics  Social Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 1052-150X
DOI 10.2307/3857638
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,433
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

18 ( #255,253 of 1,925,062 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #140,829 of 1,925,062 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.