Naturalistic methods, constitutive principles and Einstein’s elevator


First, I motivate the following contradiction: since Einstein’s elevator thought experiment is a method used in a natural science, it is a naturalistic method; yet, since it is a method used to justify a constitutive principle, it is a non-naturalistic method. Second, I argue that prima facie the best response to this contradiction, given my motivations for it, is to allow that some naturalistic methods can be used to justify constitutive principles.



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