Naturalistic methods, constitutive principles and Einstein’s elevator

Abstract

First, I motivate the following contradiction: since Einstein’s elevator thought experiment is a method used in a natural science, it is a naturalistic method; yet, since it is a method used to justify a constitutive principle, it is a non-naturalistic method. Second, I argue that prima facie the best response to this contradiction, given my motivations for it, is to allow that some naturalistic methods can be used to justify constitutive principles.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,385

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Are Kant’s Concepts and Methodology Inconsistent with Scientific Change? Constitutivity and the Synthetic Method in Kant.Paul L. Franco - 2012 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2 (2):321-353.
Naturalism’s maxims and its methods. Is naturalistic philosophy like science?Carin Robinson - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (3):371-391.
Naturalistic hermeneutics.Chrysostomos Mantzavinos - 2005 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Naturalistic Epistemologies and A Priori Justification.Lisa Warenski - 2010 - In Marcin Młlkowski & Konrad Talmont-Kaminski (eds.), Beyond Description. Naturalism and Normativity. College Publications.
A Goal-Oriented Theory of Science.David Jeremy Hymie Baumslag - 1997 - Dissertation, University of Calgary (Canada)
The normative role of logic for reasoning.Alba Massolo - 2023 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 38 (2):137-154.
Explanation and Understanding in the History of Philosophy and Ricoeur’s Theory.Sanja Ivic - 2008 - Crossroads: an interdisciplinary journal for the study of history, philosophy, religion and classics 3 (1):26-34.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-02

Downloads
13 (#1,056,980)

6 months
2 (#1,475,759)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references