Analysis 66 (289):39–44 (2006)
Yagisawa (2005) considers two old arguments against the existence requirement. Both arguments are signiﬁcantly less appealing than Yagisawa suggests. In particular, the second argument, ﬁrst given by Kaplan (1989: 498), simply assumes that existence is contingent (§1). Yagisawa’s ‘new’ argument shares this weakness. It also faces a dilemma. Yagisawa must either treat ‘at @’ as a sentential operator occupying the same grammatical position as ‘∼’ or as supplying an extra argument place. In the former case, Yagisawa’s argument faces precisely the problems he concedes that Kaplan’s argument does (§2). In the latter case, though the argument does not face these problems, it renders the sense in which things exist contingently no threat to (E) properly understood (§3).
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References found in this work BETA
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Truthmakers and the Converse Barcan Formula.Timothy Williamson - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (3-4):253–270.
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