Perceptual Motivation for Action

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (3):939-958 (2022)
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Abstract

In this paper we focus on a kind of perceptual states that we call perceptual motivations, that is, perceptual experiences that plausibly motivate us to act, such as itching, perceptual salience and pain. Itching seems to motivate you to scratch, perceiving a stimulus as salient seems to motivate you to attend to it and feeling a pain in your hand seems to motivate actions such as withdrawing from the painful stimulus. Five main accounts of perceptual motivation are available: Descriptive, Conative, Imperativist, Reflexive and Dual Content views. Some of these have been developed in detail and others are natural extensions of existing views. However, we argue that none provides a satisfactory account of the target perceptual states. Driven by the failings of each account, we identify three conditions that any satisfactory theory of perceptual motivation must meet: Direct Motivational Force, Non-Obligatory Force and Intention-Independent Influence. Then we offer an account that attempts to fulfil these conditions: the Affordance Model. This model of perceptual motivation is premised on the claim that each of the target states involves the perception of a specific affordance for action and the triggering of Automatic Motor Initiations (AMIs). We suggest that AMIs can explain the motivational force of these perceptual states.

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Author Profiles

Tom McClelland
Cambridge University
Marta Jorba
Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Citations of this work

Affordances and spatial agency in psychopathology.Joel Krueger - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (7):1828-1857.
In Defense of Introspective Affordances.David Miguel Gray - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
Affordances from a control viewpoint.Joëlle Proust - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (7):1590-1614.
Urges.Ashley Shaw - 2024 - Philosophical Review 133 (2):151–191.

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References found in this work

What the body commands: the imperative theory of pain.Colin Klein - 2015 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Pushmi-pullyu representations.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:185-200.
Affordances and the Contents of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? New York, NY: Oup Usa. pp. 39-76.
Pains as reasons.Manolo Martínez - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2261-2274.

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