Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):293-302 (2014)
In this article, I argue that an epistemic question about knowledge of our own phenomenal states encourages a certain metaphysical picture of consciousness according to which phenomenal states are reflexive mental representations. Section 1 describes and motivates the thesis that phenomenal self- knowledge is ‘receptive’: that is, the view that a subject has knowledge of their phenomenal states only insofar as they are inwardly affected by those states. In Sections 4 and 3, I argue that this model of phenomenal self- knowledge is unable to accommodate knowledge of our own phenomenology or knowledge of our own awareness. In Section 4, I seek a non-receptive model of phenomenal self- knowledge. I argue that Kriegel's Self-Representationalist theory of consciousness is uniquely equipped to show how phenomenal self- knowledge is possible.
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References found in this work BETA
Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Ramseyan Humility.David Lewis - 2009 - In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press. pp. 203-222.
Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves.Rae Langton - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
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