Receptivity and Phenomenal Self‐Knowledge

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):293-302 (2013)
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Abstract

In this article, I argue that an epistemic question about knowledge of our own phenomenal states encourages a certain metaphysical picture of consciousness according to which phenomenal states are reflexive mental representations. Section 1 describes and motivates the thesis that phenomenal self-knowledge is ‘receptive’: that is, the view that a subject has knowledge of their phenomenal states only insofar as they are inwardly affected by those states. In Sections 2 and 3, I argue that this model of phenomenal self-knowledge is unable to accommodate knowledge of our own phenomenology or knowledge of our own awareness. In Section 4, I seek a non-receptive model of phenomenal self-knowledge. I argue that Kriegel’s Self-Representationalist theory of consciousness is uniquely equipped to show how phenomenal self-knowledge is possible.

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Tom McClelland
Cambridge University

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References found in this work

Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
The Analysis of Matter.Bertrand Russell - 1927 - London: Kegan Paul.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.
Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.

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