Solitary and embedded knowledge

Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):161-169 (2000)

Abstract

I argue for the usefulness of the distinction between knowledge that is, and knowledge that is not, acquired in such a way as necessarily to be acquired along with other knowledge so acquired. Knowledge gained in the latter ways—e.g. by testimony, by linguistic stipulation—has proved philosophically puzzling. But this is because philosophers have used traditional epistemological vocabulary to try to describe what’s distinctive about it. Using the solitary/embedded distinction, we can frame descriptions that are both true, and not stipulative-seeming, of what is distinctive of knowledge gained in these ways. I illustrate these points by discussing Saul Kripke’s claim that one can gain non-linguistic knowledge by linguistic stipulation.

Download options

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-09

Downloads
274 (#40,841)

6 months
8 (#90,504)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mark McCullagh
University of Guelph

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.
How Knowledge Works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.
Presupposition and the a Priori.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):509-526.
A Priori Knowledge.Paul K. Moser (ed.) - 1987 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Epistemology Supernaturalized.William E. Mann - 1985 - Faith and Philosophy 2 (4):436-456.
A Priori and a Posteriori.Jason S. Baehr - 2003 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.