Philosophia 42 (2):459-468 (2014)

Authors
Kevin McCain
University of Alabama, Birmingham
Abstract
Recently, Dan O’Brien has argued that there are situations in which a hearer can gain testimonial knowledge from a speaker who is lying. In order to make his case, O’Brien presents two examples where a speaker lies to a hearer, but supposedly the hearer comes to have testimonial knowledge on the basis of the lying speaker’s testimony. O’Brien claims that his examples demonstrate that lies can be used to pass on knowledge in a non-inferential fashion. I argue that O’Brien is mistaken. More specifically, I argue that the hearer’s belief in the second example that O’Brien depicts fails to meet two plausible conditions for knowledge. First, the hearer’s belief fails to satisfy the requirements of the epistemic basing relation. Second, the hearer’s belief is not safe
Keywords Knowledge  Lies  Testimony
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-013-9501-y
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,232
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Justification.William Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Testimony and Lies.Dan O'Brien - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):225–238.
Testimony, Testimonial Belief, and Safety.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):205-217.
Learning From Words.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):77–101.
Knowledge on Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Knowing at Second Hand.Benjamin McMyler - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):511 – 540.
Responsibility for Testimonial Belief.Benjamin McMyler - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):337-352.
What is Wrong with Moral Testimony?Robert Hopkins - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):611-634.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-09-23

Total views
69 ( #133,733 of 2,330,036 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #254,915 of 2,330,036 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes