Abstract
Yuval Noah Harari warns of a very pessimistic future for our species: essentially; that it may be superseded by non-conscious Artificial Intelligence that can do anything we can and more. This assumes that we are physically instantiated algorithms that can be improved on in all respects. On such an assumption; our labor will become economically worthless once AI reaches a certain level. This picture; however; changes markedly if we accept the views of David Hodgson in respect of consciousness; free will; what he calls plausible reasoning; and the relationship among these. On Hodgson’s account; there will always be valuable skills requiring a particular kind of judgment that are possessed by humans; but not by non-conscious algorithmic machines; however advanced.
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References found in this work BETA

The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis.David J. Chalmers - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):9 - 10.
A History of Transhumanist Thought.Nick Bostrom - 2005 - Journal of Evolution and Technology 14 (1):1-25.
The Significance of Free Will.John Martin Fischer - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):141-148.

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