Volition and basic action

Philosophical Review 83 (4):451-473 (1974)
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to defend the view that the bodily actions of men typicaly involve a mental action of voliton or willing, and that such mental acts are, in at least one important sense, the basic actions we perform when we do things like raise an arm, move a finger, or flex a muscle

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Hugh J. McCann
Texas A&M University

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