Acta Analytica 25 (3):285-298 (2010)

Authors
Fritz J. McDonald
Oakland University
Abstract
The metaphysical dispute between moral realists and antirealists is cast in terms of properties: the realist holds that moral properties exist, the antirealist denies this claim. There is a longstanding philosophical dispute over the nature of properties, and the obscurity of properties may make the realist/antirealist dispute even more obscure. In the spirit of deflationary theories of truth, we can turn to a deflationary theory of properties in order to clarify this issue. One might reasonably worry that such an account of properties would not be capable of properly characterizing disputes regarding the existence or nonexistence of genuine moral properties. In this paper, I will show that, within this framework, the traditional disputes over the existence of moral properties can be characterized in a far clearer fashion than is usually the case. A deflationary account of properties, along with an explanatory hierarchy of properties, makes the dispute in ontology clear
Keywords ontology  metaethics  deflationism  realism  properties
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Reprint years 2010
DOI 10.1007/s12136-009-0063-3
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References found in this work BETA

Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
The Question of Realism.Kit Fine - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-30.

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