American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (4):373-385 (2014)

Authors
Brannon McDaniel
University of Richmond
Abstract
According to the presentist, it is always the case that the only existing objects are those that exist at the present time, and the only properties and relations that are instantiated are those that are instantiated at the present time. The truth-supervenes-on-being thesis (TSB) is that there can be no difference in what is true without a corresponding difference in what exists and in what properties and relations are instantiated. The truth-supervenes-on-being objection says that presentism cannot accommodate TSB. Lucretianism is the thesis that the world instantiates irreducibly past-tensed properties. Though not popular, it is not entirely uncommon for presentists to endorse Lucretianism as a means to respond to the truth-supervenes-on-being objection. Defenses of Lucretianism itself are still less common. Appropriately up-to-date defenses are lacking altogether. I take up such a defense, arguing that the attacks on Lucretianism fail, and that there is, therefore, no compelling truth-supervenes-on-being objection to presentism.
Keywords Metaphysics  Presentism  Truth  Supervenience
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Truth and Ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Virtues of Thisness Presentism.David Ingram - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2867-2888.

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