Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):23-46 (2014)
AbstractCan we understand being valuable for in terms of being valuable? Three different kinds of puzzle cases suggest that the answer is negative. In what follows, I articulate a positive answer to this question, carefully present the three puzzle cases, and then explain how a friend of the positive answer can successfully respond to them. This response requires us to distinguish different kinds of value bearers, rather than different kinds of value, and to hold that among the value bearers are totality states of affairs. The final section of the article discusses the possibility of organic unification without organic unities
Similar books and articles
Consequentialist teleology and the valuation of states of affairs.Robert F. Card - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (3):253-265.
Promoting Value As Such.Evan G. Williams - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):392-416.
Liberalism and Conservatism in the Epistemology of Perceptual Belief.Ram Neta - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):685-705.
What’s wrong with Moorean buck-passing?Francesco Orsi - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746.
How to refrain from answering Kripke’s puzzle.Lewis Powell - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):287-308.
Moore’s Paradox is not just another pragmatic paradox.Timothy Chan - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):211 - 229.
Resonance, Moorean Theories and Reflective Endorsement.Patrick H. Yarnell - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):155-172.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
The Value-Based Theory of Reasons.Barry Maguire - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
Monism and Pluralism about Value.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 136-157.
The Disjunctive Hybrid Theory of Prudential Value: An Inclusive Approach to the Good Life.Joseph Van Weelden - 2018 - Dissertation, Mcgill University
References found in this work
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.