A Moorean View of the Value of Lives

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):23-46 (2014)
Abstract
Can we understand being valuable for in terms of being valuable? Three different kinds of puzzle cases suggest that the answer is negative. In what follows, I articulate a positive answer to this question, carefully present the three puzzle cases, and then explain how a friend of the positive answer can successfully respond to them. This response requires us to distinguish different kinds of value bearers, rather than different kinds of value, and to hold that among the value bearers are totality states of affairs. The final section of the article discusses the possibility of organic unification without organic unities
Keywords intrinsic value  G.E. Moore  welfare  valuable for
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/papq.12015
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,803
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics.L. W. Sumner - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1930 - Clarendon Press.
Plural Predication.Thomas J. McKay - 2006 - Oxford University Press.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Normative Accounts of Fundamentality.Kris McDaniel - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):167-183.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Infinity in Ethics.Peter Vallentyne - unknown - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Consequentialist Teleology and the Valuation of States of Affairs.Robert F. Card - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (3):253-265.
Promoting Value As Such.Evan G. Williams - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):392-416.
Liberalism and Conservatism in the Epistemology of Perceptual Belief.Ram Neta - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):685-705.
What's Wrong with Moorean Buck-Passing?Francesco Orsi - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746.
A Moorean Paradox of Desire.David Wall - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):63-84.
Questions and Answers.Henry Hiz - 1907 - The Classical Review 21 (7):220-220.
How to Refrain From Answering Kripke's Puzzle.Lewis Powell - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):287-308.
Spinoza on Friendship.Frank Lucash - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (2):305-317.
Physicalism and Moorean Supervenience.Tom Polger - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):72-92.
Resonance, Moorean Theories and Reflective Endorsement.Patrick H. Yarnell - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):155-172.
Life Extension Versus Replacement.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2008 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (3):211-227.
Added to PP index
2013-08-07

Total downloads
61 ( #89,260 of 2,202,718 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #20,445 of 2,202,718 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature