Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):23-46 (2014)
Can we understand being valuable for in terms of being valuable? Three different kinds of puzzle cases suggest that the answer is negative. In what follows, I articulate a positive answer to this question, carefully present the three puzzle cases, and then explain how a friend of the positive answer can successfully respond to them. This response requires us to distinguish different kinds of value bearers, rather than different kinds of value, and to hold that among the value bearers are totality states of affairs. The final section of the article discusses the possibility of organic unification without organic unities
|Keywords||intrinsic value G.E. Moore welfare valuable for|
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Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism.Fred Feldman - 2004 - Clarendon Press.
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