Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):23-46 (2014)

Authors
Kris McDaniel
Syracuse University
Abstract
Can we understand being valuable for in terms of being valuable? Three different kinds of puzzle cases suggest that the answer is negative. In what follows, I articulate a positive answer to this question, carefully present the three puzzle cases, and then explain how a friend of the positive answer can successfully respond to them. This response requires us to distinguish different kinds of value bearers, rather than different kinds of value, and to hold that among the value bearers are totality states of affairs. The final section of the article discusses the possibility of organic unification without organic unities
Keywords intrinsic value  G.E. Moore  welfare  valuable for
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1111/papq.12015
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics.L. W. Sumner - 1996 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Value-Based Theory of Reasons.Barry Maguire - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
Monism and Pluralism About Value.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 136-157.
Normative Accounts of Fundamentality.Kris McDaniel - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):167-183.

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