A Philosophical Model of the Relation between Things in Themselves and Appearances

Noûs 49 (4):643-664 (2015)
Abstract
I introduce a methodology for doing the history of philosophy called philosophical modeling. I then employ this methodology to give a theory of Kant's distinction between things in themselves and appearances. This theory models Kant's distinction on the distinction between a constituting object and the object it constitutes.
Keywords transcendental idealism  things in themselves  Kant  material constittution  methodology  history of philosophy
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DOI 10.1111/nous.12036
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Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem.Karen Bennett - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (3):339-371.

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