Mind 108 (430):291-334 (1999)
Common sense suggests that counterfactuals are capable of truth and falsity, and that their truth values depend on more than just the actual course of events. Projectivists, like Mackie, deny the first; reductivists, like Lewis, deny the second. I criticize Mackie's and Lewis's theories, thereby defending realism. There are parallel issues and positions concerning the other concepts of the natural necessity family. A realist theory may also have a positive part, consisting of an account of some of the conceptual relations within this family. I try to cast light on the counterfactual by postulating a relation of accessibility between possible worlds - accessibility at the 'point' at which an event occurs.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
An Argument for Conjunction Conditionalization.Lee Walters & Robert Williams - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):573-588.
Dispositions, Conditionals, and Counterexamples.D. Manley & R. Wasserman - 2011 - Mind 120 (480):1191-1227.
Conditional Excluded Middle Without the Limit Assumption.Eric Swanson - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):301-321.
Similar books and articles
Can Counterfactuals Really Be About Possible Worlds?Stephen Barker - 2011 - Noûs 45 (3):557-576.
A Dilemma for the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.S. Barker - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):62 – 77.
Counterfactuals: Ambiguities, True Premises, and Knowledge.Igal Kvart - 1994 - Synthese 100 (1):133 - 164.
Counterfactuals, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and Causation.S. Barker - 1999 - Mind 108 (431):427-469.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads203 ( #20,079 of 2,169,071 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #345,851 of 2,169,071 )
How can I increase my downloads?