Existence and Number

Analytic Philosophy 54 (2):209-228 (2013)
Abstract
The Frege-Russell view is that existence is a second-order property rather than a property of individuals. One of the most compelling arguments for this view is based on the premise that there is an especially close connection between existence and number. The most promising version of this argument is by C.J.F Williams (1981, 1992). In what follows, I argue that this argument fails. I then defend an account according to which both predications of number and existence attribute properties to individuals
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DOI 10.1111/phib.12013
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References found in this work BETA
Parts of Classes.David Lewis - 1991 - Blackwell.
Parthood.Theodore Sider - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (1):51-91.
Posthumous Writings.Gottlob Frege - 1991 - Wiley-Blackwell.

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The Intelligibility of Metaphysical Structure.Peter Finocchiaro - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-26.

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