Metaphysics and conceptual analysis: Lewis on indeterministic causation

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):396 – 403 (1997)
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Abstract

Lewis considers (Postscript B to 'Causation') the objection that what he calls a plain case of probabilistic causation is really a probable case of plain causation. He replies that the objection rests on the false metaphysical assumption that counterfactuals whose consequents are about events (rather than chances) can be true under indeterminism. The present note argues that this is the wrong kind of reply, because metaphysics is never relevant to conceptual analysis

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Causation as property acquisition.S. D. Rieber - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 109 (1):53 - 74.

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References found in this work

Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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