Prolegomena 10 (1):39-52 (2011)

Authors
Fritz J. McDonald
Oakland University
Abstract
Properties and facts play a central role within metaphysics, yet there is no widely accepted account of what constitutes a property or a fact. Traditional conceptions of these metaphysical notions raise serious philosophical puzzles, making the existence of each seem dubious. Drawing on the minimalist theory of truth, I argue in favor of a minimalist conception of properties and facts. A minimalist theory of properties and facts explains these matters in terms of the acceptance of trivial schemas. To make the case that minimalism is a superior approach to properties and facts, I argue against the standard views in the philosophical literature. I argue that the minimalist approach to properties has advantages over realism, nominalism, and the trope theory. I argue that the minimalist approach to facts is superior to the standard treatment of facts on correspondence theories. Metaphysical minimalism, a minimalist metaphysics of properties and facts, is a distinct and superior alternative to the theories of properties and facts currently on offer.Iako svojstva i činjenice u metafizici igraju središnju ulogu, ne postoji usuglašen opis toga što sačinjava svojstvo ili činjenicu. Tradicionalne koncepcije tih metafizičkih pojmova povlače za sobom ozbiljne filozofske zagonetke, zbog kojih se postojanje i svojstava i činjenica čini dvojbenim. Oslanjajući se na minimalističku teoriju istine, iznosim argumente u prilog minimalističkoj koncepciji svojstava i činjenica. Minimalistička teorija objašnjava svojstva i činjenice na osnovi prihvaćanja trivijalnih shema. Kako bih dokazao da je minimalizam nadmoćan pristup svojstvima i činjenicama, iznosim argumente protiv standardnih gledišta u filozofskoj literaturi. Tvrdim da minimalistički pristup svojstvima ima prednosti u odnosu na realizam, minimalizam i teoriju tropa. Tvrdim da je minimalistički pristup činjenicama nadmoćan standardnom shvaćanju činjenica u teorijama korespondencije. Metafizički minimalizam, minimalistička metafizika svojstava i činjenica, neovisna je i nadmoćna alternativa postojećim teorijama svojstava i činjenica.
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New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Philosophical Papers.J. L. Austin - 1961 - Oxford University Press.

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