Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):303–331 (2006)
Possibilism—the view that there are non-actual, merely possible entities—is a surprisingly resilient doctrine.1 One particularly hardy strand of possibilism—the modal realism championed by David Lewis—continues to attract both foes who seek to demonstrate its falsity (or at least stare its advocates into apostasy) and friends who hope to defend modal realism (or, when necessary, modify modal realism so as to avoid problematic objections).2 Although I am neither a foe nor friend of modal realism (but some of my best friends are!), like many I continue to be fascinated by the doctrine.
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New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.
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