Presentism and Absence Causation: An Exercise in Mimicry

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):323-332 (2010)
Abstract
If _presentism_ is true, then no wholly non-present events exist. If _absence orthodoxy_ is true, then no absences exist. I discuss a well-known causal argument against presentism, and develop a very similar argument against absence orthodoxy. I argue that solutions to the argument against absence orthodoxy can be adopted by the presentist as solutions to the argument against presentism. The upshot is that if the argument against absence orthodoxy fails, then so does the argument against presentism
Keywords Metaphysics  Philosophy of Time  Presentism  Absence Causation
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Reprint years 2010
DOI 10.1080/00048400802674735
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Truth and Ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Clarendon Press.
Physical Causation.Phil Dowe - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Tensed Supervenience: A No‐Go for Presentism.Sam Baron - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):383-401.
Talking About the Past.Sam Baron - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (3):547-560.
Presentism and Causation Revisited.Sam Baron - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (1):1-21.

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