Propositions: Individuation and Invirtuation

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):757-768 (2015)
Abstract
The pressure to individuate propositions more finely than intensionally—that is, hyper-intensionally—has two distinct sources. One source is the philosophy of mind: one can believe a proposition without believing an intensionally equivalent proposition. The second source is metaphysics: there are intensionally equivalent propositions, such that one proposition is true in virtue of the other but not vice versa. I focus on what our theory of propositions should look like when it's guided by metaphysical concerns about what is true in virtue of what. In this paper I articulate and defend a metaphysical theory of the individuation of propositions, according to which two propositions are identical just in case they occupy the same nodes in a network of invirtuation relations. Invirtuation is here taken to be a primitive relation of metaphysical explanation exemplified by propositions that, in conjunction with truth, defines the notion of true in virtue of. After formulating the theory, I compare it with a view..
Keywords propositions  grounding  in virtue of  identity conditions  structuralism  hyper-intensionality
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2015.1035291
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References found in this work BETA
Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 2004 - Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535–579.
The Possibility of Physicalism.Shamik Dasgupta - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (9-10):557-592.
On What Grounds What.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In David Manley, David J. Chalmers & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.

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