Tyler Burge on disjunctivism

Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):243-255 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In Burge 2005, Tyler Burge reads disjunctivism as the denial that there are explanatorily relevant states in common between veridical perceptions and corresponding illusions. He rejects the position as plainly inconsistent with what is known about perception. I describe a disjunctive approach to perceptual experience that is immune to Burge's attack. The main positive moral concerns how to think about fallibility.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,174

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Replies From Tyler Burge.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. University of Chicago Press.
What Do Your Senses Say? On Burge’s Theory of Perception.Christopher Gauker - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):311-323.
Disjunctivism Again.Tyler Burge - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):43-80.
Tyler Burge's Self-Knowledge.Ted A. Warfield - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):169-178.
Disjunctivism and Perceptual Psychology.Tyler Burge - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):1-78.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-21

Downloads
957 (#7,422)

6 months
11 (#74,004)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism.John McDowell - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):243-255.
Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism.John McDowell - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (3):259-279.
Disjunctivism Again.Tyler Burge - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):43-80.

View all 53 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.

View all 23 references / Add more references