The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):162-170 (2015)
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Abstract

Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called ‘deviant’ causal chains. For each such theory, counterexamples are formed using odd or co-incidental causal chains to establish that the theory is committed to unpalatable claims about some intentional action, about a case of veridical perception or about the acquisition of genuine knowledge. In this paper I will argue that three well-known examples of a deviant causal chain have something in common: they each violate Yablos proportionality constraint on causation. I will argue that this constraint provides the key to saving causal theories from deviant chains.

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Neil McDonnell
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Getting a Moral Thing Into a Thought: Metasemantics for Non-Naturalists.Preston J. Werner - 2020 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 140-169.
An attempt at a general solution to the problem of deviant causal chains.Shane Ward - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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References found in this work

Mental causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
A causal theory of knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.
The Causal Theory of Perception.H. P. Grice & Alan R. White - 1961 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 35 (1):121-168.
Freedom to act.Donald Davidson - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Routledge.
A Causal Theory of Knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 18-30.

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